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Abstract
For humans we implicitly assume that the way we do things is the product of social learning and thus
cultural. For animals, this conclusion requires proof. Here, we first review the most commonly used pro-
cedure for documenting animal culture: the method of exclusion, which charts geographic behavioral vari-
ation between populations as evidence for culture. Using published data, we show that, whereas it is an
adequate proof of principle, the method of exclusion has major deficiencies when capturing cultural diver-
sity and complexity. Therefore, we propose a new method, namely the direct counting of socially learned
skills, which we apply to previously collected data on wild orangutans. This method reveals a far greater
cultural repertoire among orangutans, and a different distribution of cultural elements among behavioral
domains than found by the method of exclusion, as well as clear ecological correlates for most cultural
elements. The widespread occurrence of social learning ability throughout the animal kingdom suggests
that these conclusions also apply to many other species. Culture is most likely more widespread and
pervasive than commonly thought and an important avenue to local adaptation. The complex and
normative dimensions of culture seem unique to our species, but were most likely built upon a very
broad, pre-existing cultural capacity that we inherited from our ancestors.
Key words: culture; social learning; method of exclusion; orangutans; animal cultural repertoires
Social media summary: A new way to assess animal cultures suggests that culture is far more
widespread and pervasive than commonly thought.
Introduction
For a long time, culture was seen as an exclusively, and thus defining, human feature (Tylor, 1871).
However, when evidence for culture-like variation was also found in a variety of non-human animal
species, it became apparent that culture is part of a phylogenetic continuum rather than a uniquely
human trait (Whiten, 2012). A clear definition of the phenomenon, universally agreed upon by dif-
ferent research fields, is called for, because the way we define culture has significant implications
for where we will find it.
The oldest explicit definition by a cultural anthropologist regards culture as ‘that complex whole
which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits
acquired by man as a member of society’ (Tylor, 1871). This human-oriented definition stresses
that virtually everything we do, know or believe, as well as our institutions and technology, are a prod-
uct of social learning and thus cultural (Braidwood, 1975). Notably, although the definition includes
normative elements as products of culture, it does not claim that all culture is normative. It also leaves
implicit how ‘complex’ culture has to be to qualify as such. In order to examine how human culture
arose, biologists adapted this definition to non-human animals by describing culture as ‘all behaviors
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and knowledge that are acquired and passed on within and between generations through social learn-
ing’ (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Hereafter, we refer to this as the minimal definition of culture.
Both definitions recognize that the precondition for culture is a demonstrated reliance on social
learning, i.e. learning through observing, associating with or interacting with other individuals or
their products (Heyes, 2012). However, whereas the minimal definition of culture as all socially
learned skills and knowledge (at some point expressed in behavior) is still widely used by researchers
studying culture in animals (Fragaszy and Perry, 2003; van Schaik, 2010; Whiten, 2017), some have
argued that culture must be more than the product of social learning.
Thus, it has been proposed that socially learned behaviors can only qualify as cultural if they are
normative, i.e. that an individual’s deviant behaviors are sanctioned by its social group (Hill, 2009;
McGrew, 2004). Others have argued that culture must be subject to cumulative change over time
(Hill, 2009; Levinson, 2006; Tomasello et al., 1993), and/or transmitted by high-fidelity forms of social
learning such as imitation or teaching (Galef, 1992). Effectively, this means that only behaviors
exceeding a minimum level of complexity qualify as cultural. Yet others have required transmission
across multiple generations as an essential criterion (sometimes also referred to as traditions; Perry,
2009a, b; Whiten and van Schaik, 2007). Finally, it has been suggested that culture requires socially
learned variants in a variety of behavioral domains (Whiten and van Schaik, 2007).
In short, all definitions agree that skills and knowledge that are learned through a form of social
learning are the quintessence of culture, irrespective of the actual social learning mechanism used.
The more demanding definitions appear to reflect an attempt to distinguish the cultures of different
taxa, especially humans from animals, although many habits we naturally call culture in humans are
neither normative nor complex or diverse. Yet if we see culture as an overarching concept, it allows us
to see normativity, complexity, stability or diversity as aspects of culture, each with a phylogenetic dis-
tribution. Thus, the minimal culture definition (Boyd and Richerson, 1985) allows comparisons across
species and allows us to find out about the evolutionary roots of a trait in which our species undeni-
ably outranges all others. This approach allows us to study culture from the bottom up rather than
assuming that the human case represents the gold standard. Following the minimal definition of cul-
ture, we do not differentiate between different levels of social learning, because most skills and knowl-
edge, often in humans as well, can be transferred through simple forms of social learning (e.g.
enhancement or socially induced practice) and do not require high-fidelity forms of social learning
(e.g. imitation or teaching; van Schaik et al., 2017). Accordingly, most behaviors that we will here con-
sider as socially learned and thus cultural are within the innovative reach of an individual and not
culture-dependent per se (Tennie et al., 2009).
How to Measure Culture?
When the minimal culture definition is applied to non-human animals, a significant problem arises. It
is virtually impossible to demonstrate social transmission in nature, and where this was done unam-
biguously via field experiments, it was not clear whether the experimentally transmitted behaviors
would persist over time (Reader and Biro, 2010; Whiten and Mesoudi, 2008). Thus, researchers
have come to rely mainly on another approach, where they focus on one of the products of culture,
namely geographic variation, to prove its presence.
If behaviors are acquired through social learning rather than invented independently, they are more
likely to show geographic variation between populations because the underlying innovations are
bound to be made only sporadically (Galef, 1976; Nishida, 1987). In humans, such contrasts between
societies are automatically assumed to be the result of social transmission. However, for animals two
alternative, non-exclusive explanations need to be excluded (McGrew and Tutin, 1978): (1) individu-
ally plastic responses to ecological differences between populations; and (2) population differences in
genetic predispositions. This line of argumentation laid the foundation of the currently most com-
monly used tool to detect the presence of animal culture, namely the method of exclusion (MoE,
also frequently referred to as the ethnographic method; Whiten et al., 1999) in which we classify a
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behavior as cultural if we can demonstrate a high prevalence in some populations but its absence in
others, but also can reasonably rule out genetic or ecological factors as causes of this behavioral dif-
ference (Galef, 1976; Nishida, 1987).
Ruling out ecological effects underlying behavioral variation is difficult, and ruling out genetic
effects is next to impossible. Yet where it can be done convincingly (e.g. Krützen et al., 2011;
Lycett et al., 2009, 2011, but also Langergraber et al., 2010; Langergraber and Vigilant, 2011), we
can identify cases where it is highly plausible that the observed variation is indeed the result of cultural
transmission, especially when backed up by data on the social transmission process. The MoE is there-
fore a very useful proof of principle (van Schaik, 2010). Since for many species detailed data on indi-
vidual behavior acquisition is lacking, the MoE has been used to suggest the presence of culture in
species known to be capable of social learning in captivity. Accordingly, the MoE has revealed cultural
variation in various primate, cetacean and bird species (Catchpole and Slater, 2003; Hohmann and
Fruth, 2003; Krutzen et al., 2005; Ottoni and Izar, 2008; Perry et al., 2003; Riebel et al., 2015;
Robbins et al., 2016; Santorelli et al., 2011; van Schaik et al., 2003a; Whitehead and Rendell, 2014;
Whiten et al., 1999).
Although intended as a tool to detect the presence of culture (Galef, 1976; Nishida, 1987), the cri-
teria of the MoE are now so ingrained that this operationalization has, to all practical purposes,
reached the status of the definition of animal culture: cultural status is only assigned to behaviors
that show geographic variation between populations (van Schaik, 2010). In other words, a ‘cultural
behavior is one that is transmitted repeatedly through social or observational learning to become a
population-level characteristic’ (Whiten et al., 1999). This perspective entails that culture is not an
individual-level, but rather a population-level trait (see below).
For a variety of species, the MoE has been used to describe and compare cultural repertoire sizes
(Robbins et al., 2016; Santorelli et al., 2011; van Schaik et al., 2003a; Whiten et al., 1999). However, we
can list several shortcomings of the MoE (van Schaik et al., 2009) which conspire to produce biased
and highly restrictive estimates of cultural repertoires.
First, social learning does not necessarily result in between-group heterogeneity. Identical ecological
conditions are likely to bring about the same behavioral innovations in separate social units. Cultural
transmission driven by social learning will thus inevitably produce similarities in behavioral reper-
toires between them, just as evolution driven by natural selection will often come up with the same
genetic adaptations in similar environments. Whereas the latter is a widely acknowledged phenom-
enon, namely convergent evolution, the possibility of convergent culture is not yet widely
acknowledged.
Second, the MoE ignores all behavioral variants that covary with ecological factors, even if the
behaviors are in fact socially learned and thus cultural (van Schaik et al., 2009). Social learning will
often produce behaviors that are adapted to a population’s ecological conditions and help individuals
to exploit natural resources (Byrne et al., 2004). Thus naturally, a substantial part of a species’ cultural
repertoire should indeed be linked to the local environment (Figure 1; Koops et al., 2014; Laland and
Janik, 2006). Human culture exemplifies that ecological differences drastically shape cultural behavior.
Ecology may make it impossible for certain socially learned behaviors to appear in some regions, but
their presence elsewhere still reflects cultural processes.
Third, because the MoE excludes the majority of cultural variation with ecological components, it is
heavily biased in the kinds of cultural variation it captures (see below). Whereas it detects dispropor-
tionately more behaviors of the social domain and complex dietary inventions such as tool use, it
underestimates culturally transmitted basic subsistence skills. However, it is highly unlikely that the
mechanisms of social learning are exclusively deployed for the acquisition of complex innovations;
routine subsistence skills are almost certainly acquired in the same way.
Fourth, the MoE treats genetic differences underlying behavioral variation between populations as a
deal breaker for culture. Genetic differences indeed often correlate with behavioral differences, which
suggests that genetic differences may play a role in creating behavioral differences (Langergraber et al.,
2010). Yet, in practice, genetic components do not rule out the presence of social learning (Laland and
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Janik, 2006; Krützen et al., 2011). As with any complex phenotypic traits in nature, it is unlikely that
behavioral repertoires can be strictly divided into innate and learned components. In particular, higher
forms of social learning (Van Schaik, 2016; e.g. imitation, emulation and intentional teaching), which
are based on a motivation to closely attend to the action of conspecifics, are likely to entail an element
of genetically anchored social interest (Schuppli and van Schaik, 2019). According to the minimal def-
inition of culture, behaviors based on genetic predispositions but expressed through socially mediated
learning are to be considered as cultural.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the number of cultural variants detected by the MoE is highly
dependent on the number of populations we compare. Whereas a behavior X may well be shared
between populations A and B, it may not be shared with population C. If we compare only populations
A and B, behavior X will not be considered to be cultural, because it is found in all of the populations
compared. If we then add population C to this comparison, behavior X will suddenly count as cultural
because it is not universally shared among all compared populations. This inevitably leads to an
underestimation of cultural repertoires.
To illustrate this last point, let us turn to the most extensive list of cultural elements for any animal
species published to date, namely the chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1999). By comparing the behavioral
repertoires of seven chimpanzee populations, a total of 39 behavioral variants were recognized, mainly
composed of complex feeding skills (i.e. feeding techniques that contain multiple steps of processing,
for example tool use) as well as several social behaviors. However, several variants are present at most
sites and only lacking at a few sites. Consequently, if we only compared a subset of the number of
populations, we would capture far fewer cultural variants (Figure 1). More importantly, the trajectory
of the curve in Figure 1 suggests that, even by including all seven sites in the comparison, we are far
from capturing the true chimpanzee cultural repertoire. Adding more populations into the compari-
son would probably lead to a further increase in the number of cultural variants. Accordingly, the
repertoires obtained by the MoE are inherently incomplete.
The MoE is, without doubt, a great tool to detect likely cultural variation between populations.
However, using geographic variation as the defining feature of culture makes it impossible to connect
individual-level capacities to the trait. Furthermore, the MoE is a very poor technique to estimate
either the size or the contents of cultural repertoires. If we applied this technique to humans, only
a small and highly biased subset of what we naturally claim as part of our culture would remain,
Figure 1. The number of recorded cultural variants as a function of populations being compared by the method of exclusion (MoE).
The mean number of likely cultural variants described according to the criteria of the MoE by comparing the behavioral repertoires
of an increasing number of chimpanzee populations. Based on data from Whiten et al. (1999).
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leaving out, for instance, most subsistence-related behaviors. Consequently, the lists of cultural var-
iants described for non-human animal species in previous studies potentially vastly underestimate
the actual sizes of their cultural repertoires.
Describing Animal Culture without Relying on Geographic Variation
To avoid the biases of the MoE, and capture culture irrespective of geographic variation, we here pro-
pose a novel way to estimate animal culture by directly capturing the process of cultural transmission,
namely social learning. We propose to first identify and validate indicators of forms of social learning
as actual means of social learning in a given species and then count the behaviors for which we can
document that individuals deploy these indicators during skill acquisition. We call this procedure the
method of counting socially learned skills (SLS).
Counting socially learned skills in orangutans
We test the SLS on wild orangutans, in which social interactions (including incidents of social learn-
ing) are rather easy to quantify because of the species’ low level of sociability (van Schaik, 1999).
Recently, we studied peering behavior (i.e. attentive and sustained close-range watching of the activities
of a conspecific) in immature orangutans (Pongo sp.; Schuppli et al., 2016a). We found strong evidence
that peering by immatures is an expression of socially induced learning, since it was followed by select-
ive practice, decreased with growing competence of the peerer and was more and more directed at less
familiar role models with increasing age of the immature peerers. Furthermore, peering rates increased
with increasing rarity and complexity of the observed behavior.
Having validated peering as an index of social learning, we will first estimate the prevalence of
social learning in orangutans by looking at how often individuals peer over their life time. By extrapo-
lating cumulative peering counts based on known peering rates at different ages, we found that, over
the course of their lives, Sumatran and Bornean orangutans (Pongo abelii and Pongo pygmaeus
wurmbi) at the Suaq and Tuanan research sites peer around 38,000 and 9000 times (Figure 2).
Individual’s rates of peering are reduced to a minimum as adulthood is reached, at age 15.
When we documented the peered-at behaviors our results showed that immatures peered for 195
and 122 different variants, including skills and knowledge elements (i.e. behavioral expressions of
knowledge which shows no distinct skill, e.g. diet repertoires which are based on knowing that a cer-
tain fruit is edible), which we designated as probably SLS (Figure 3). This number is far greater than
the 29 and 25 variants recognized by the MoE (van Schaik et al., 2009). Thus, when looking closely at
great ape skill acquisition, it seems that immatures learn virtually all of their skills socially.
When we compare the repertoires captured by the SLS and MoE (Figure 3) it becomes apparent that
theyalso differ in the composition of the resulting culture catalogs. The SLSdetectedmost socially learned
skills in the foraging domain (food items and feeding techniques), followed by nesting behaviors, social
behaviors, moving habits, tool use variants and other behaviors. TheMoE produced a more equal distri-
bution of SLS over these different categories. Moreover, the variants captured by the MoE were mainly
conspicuous high-complexity behaviors, which are easy to notice for the human observer because they
contain multiple steps of distinct, coordinated actions (in the case of Suaq, three tool use variants and
five other high-complexity feeding techniques which contain multiple steps of processing, three distinct
and loud vocalizations and four distinct social behaviors). The SLS list, in contrast, wasmainly composed
of basic feeding, nesting, and social skills. Most of the peered-at behaviors showed clear ecological corre-
lates (e.g. food items that are only present at one site).
Comparing the Two Methods to Capture Animal Culture
According to the minimal definition of culture (Boyd and Richerson, 1985), an individual’s cultural
repertoire is the sum of all socially learned skills and knowledge (C1=∑SLS; Figure 3). According
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to the population-level concept of culture (culture as all behaviors that show interpopulation geo-
graphic variation), it is the sum of all SLS minus the sum of all cultural behaviors shared between
the compared populations (CVar =∑C1−∑CU, Figure 4). The difference between these two measures
of cultural repertoire sizes is, among other factors, dependent on the innovation rate in relation to
transmission efficiency.
The cultural repertoires recorded by the MoE should be a direct subset of the sum of all socially
learned behaviors that show geographic variation because they disregard any variants with ecological
or genetic correlates. We will disregard genetic predispositions, because linking single behaviors to
specific genes remains impossible, most likely because such direct links do not exist. The strength
of ecological influences on culture is a positive function of the difference we get from subtracting
the cultural repertoires captured by the MoE (CME) from the sum of all socially learned behaviors
that show geographic variation (CVar), i.e. CVar – CME =∑CEcol (Figure 4). A large difference implies
that a lot of cultural variation is ecologically induced. Among orangutans, for instance, we find that
many of their socially learned behaviors do indeed show ecological correlates such as food-processing
skills or diet knowledge, which are highly dependent on the local availability of plant species.
So far, the effects of ecology on cultural variation have not yet been properly investigated. However,
what has been shown is that ecological conditions have a strong effect on the two cornerstones of cul-
ture, namely innovation as the source of all culture and social learning as the underlying transmission
mechanism of culture. First, innovation rates are heavily influenced by local ecology in terms of eco-
logical opportunities (Koops et al., 2014; Reader et al., 2016; Spagnoletti et al., 2012; Torralvo et al.,
2017). Second, social learning is influenced by ecological conditions such as terrestriality (Heldstab
et al., 2016; Meulman et al., 2012; Sanz and Morgan, 2013; Spagnoletti et al., 2009; Visalberghi
et al., 2005) or ecologically induced levels of sociability (Liker and Bókony, 2009; Roberts, 1996;
Schuppli et al., 2017; van Schaik et al., 2003b). Furthermore, especially in long-lived species, increased
learning efficiency through social learning is an important strategy to flexibly adapt to changing envir-
onments with local adaptations (Byrne et al., 2004; Laland and Janik, 2006). As such, cultural capacity
is highly adaptive.
To assess repertoire sizes, the SLS may be a great improvement over the MoE, but it may still miss
cultural variants. Indeed, only around half of the orangutan cultural variants detected by the MoE were
Figure 2. Lifetime orangutan peering. Extrapolated cumulative peering events over different ages for individuals at Suaq and
Tuanan. See supplementary Table S1 for details.
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also captured by the SLS (18 of 29 for Suaq and 12 of 25 for Tuanan). The cultural variants for which
we have no recorded peering events include behaviors whose transmission does not rely on peering
(vocalizations and social interactions) or which are rarely performed. At both sites the lists of peered-at
behaviors are still growing, despite massive follow efforts (around 19,000 hours for Suaq and 82,000
Figure 3. Comparing two methods to describe cultural repertoires. Number of cultural behaviors and knowledge elements caught
by counting socially learned skills (SLS) vs relying on the MoE for the two orangutan populations at Suaq and Tuanan. See sup-
plementary Tables S2 and S3 for the lists of peered at behaviors and behaviors caught by the MoE.
Figure 4. Different operationalizations of culture. The cultural behaviors captured by the MoE (CME) are socially learned behaviors
with a patchy geographic distribution but without ecological correlates (mostly conspicuous and/or high complexity behaviors
such as tool use). The cultural behaviors with ecological correlates (CEcol) are socially learned behaviors that vary between popula-
tions because they are influenced by a population’s local ecology (e.g. feeding skills). The sum of CME and CEcol are all socially
learned behaviors that vary across populations (CVar). Cultural universals (CU) are socially learned behaviors and knowledge
that we find consistently across populations (e.g. basic subsistence and social skills). The sum of all socially learned behaviors
represents an individual’s cultural knowledge (C1 = CVar + CU). See supplementary Table S3 descriptions of the behaviors depicted
on the pictures.
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hours for Tuanan). It takes thousands of observation hours to capture an individual’s complete behav-
ioral repertoire (Schuppli et al., 2016b). Also, even immatures who are still learning do not peer on
every occasion of a behavior to be learned and we certainly miss a share of the peering events. In
short, the current numbers still underestimate the real extent of the orangutan cultural repertoire.
Discussion
The base of the great ape culture iceberg
The orangutan example suggests that by relying on the MoE to assess cultural repertoires we have so
far only discovered the tip of the great ape culture iceberg (i.e. C1 >> CME; Figure 4). The MoE pro-
duces a biased sample of highly complex and conspicuous behaviors and dismisses a vast array of
socially learned behaviors that covary with ecological factors. By counting socially learned skills, how-
ever, we are beginning to get to know the base of this iceberg. Cultural repertoires are mainly com-
posed of basic, low-complexity subsistence skills, most of which show clear ecological correlates
(e.g. knowledge of diet composition and processing techniques). Thus, a lot of (but not all) cultural
variation may indeed be ecologically induced (CEcol is a major part of C1 and CVar).
At the same time, a systematic reliance on social learning under similar ecological conditionsmay very
well lead to many universal cultural behavior patterns across populations. The most striking example in
the orangutans for this is nest building: even though it is an orangutan universal, it takes young orangu-
tans years of close observation and subsequent practice before they can build nests good enough to spend
the night in (Schuppli et al., 2016a), and socially deprived young apes will never be able to do so
(Bernstein, 1962; Videan, 2006). The basic construction of nests (a rim made of intertwined long
branches) is highly comparable across different orangutan populations, presumably because it is the
most latent solution to the problem (Tennie et al., 2009; high CU but low CEcol).
How much culture is there in other animals?
The points discussed above are unlikely to be true only for orangutans or great apes in general but
most certainly apply to all species that rely on social learning. Although numerous species, including
insects, fish, birds and mammals, are now known to be capable of social learning (reviewed by Galef
and Laland, 2005; Rapaport and Brown, 2008; Reader and Biro, 2010; Whiten, 2017), for most, social
learning has so far only been shown in captivity, which does not elucidate to what extent species
indeed use this ability in the wild (Reader and Biro, 2010; Whiten and van de Waal, 2018). Even
though behavioral scientists now increasingly acknowledge the role of social learning (van Schaik
and Burkart, 2011; Tomasello, 1999; van Schaik et al., 2017), it is still widely treated as the rare
and complex exception under the skill acquisition modes.
However, social learning can be quite simple given that many forms of social learning (e.g.
enhancement or facilitation) do not require higher forms of cognition but nonetheless produce faithful
behavioral copies owing to shared affordances. Furthermore, from the perspective of naïve immatures,
a strong reliance on social learning is highly adaptive because social learning is less dangerous and
more efficient than independent learning: it reduces the risk of getting injured or poisoned, increases
learning speed by allowing the learning individual to benefit from what others have figured out before
and increases the signal strength of relevant information (van Schaik and Burkart, 2011). Social learn-
ing thus allows for the fast acquisition of skills and the acquisition of more complex skills, and naïve
individuals will benefit from choosing this option whenever they can. As such, we expect social learn-
ing to be most prominent in species with contact between generations, high social tolerance toward
immatures, and an extended period of immaturity.
Over the last two decades it has become increasingly clear that social learning is indeed an import-
ant means of natural skill acquisition for many mammal and bird species, as evidenced in inherited
dietary specializations, selective observations of skilled individuals, master apprentice interactions,
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effects of the presence of role models on foraging success or links between social networks and skill
repertoires (Coelho et al., 2015; Estes et al., 2003; Griesser and Suzuki, 2016; Guinet and Bouvier, 1995;
Hobaiter et al., 2014; Kitowski, 2009; Krutzen et al., 2005; Lonsdorf, 2006; Mann et al., 2007;
Matsuzawa et al., 2001; Ottoni et al., 2005; Rapaport and Brown, 2008; Schuppli et al., 2016a).
Direct observations of the spread of recently made innovations through social groups are bound to
be rare but have been made in natural populations (Allen et al., 2013; Hobaiter et al., 2014; Kendal
et al., 2010). Interspecific cross-fostering experiments, be they designed or accidental, although
both quite rare, have impressively demonstrated the pervasiveness of social learning of life’s skills
(Rowley and Chapman, 1986; Sheppard et al., 2018; Slagsvold and Wiebe, 2007; Warner, 1988).
Culture is therefore likely to be pervasive in all species that pass on knowledge and skills socially.
However, most of these species’ skills will show little or no geographic variation, except for the most
complex skills, which are the least likely to be invented and retained. In several species, the acquisition
of basic foraging skills was shown to be socially mediated: in aye-ayes (Daubentonia madagascariensis),
for example, immatures learn tap-foraging – for which they even have morphological specializations –
far less readily in the absence of adult role models (Krakauer, 2005).
Since social learning can be very simple, culture does not require a large brain and it is therefore
unlikely to be a hallmark of cognitive complexity (Byrne et al., 2004; Laland and Hoppitt, 2003),
although the efficiency of cultural transmission may also favor the evolution of greater investment
in brains (van Schaik and Burkart, 2011).
Remaining challenges in the animal culture debate
Detecting animal culture irrespective of geographic variation is challenging and may not always be
possible. Aside from peering, social learning can also happen via observation at longer distances,
socially induced encounters with environmental features and acoustic transmission. Thus, in order
to be able to draw conclusions about and compare cultural repertoires across species, it is crucial to
find appropriate ways to detect social learning according to the species’ main transmission mode as
well as to take different transmission modes into account. The SLS will thus most likely only rarely
produce integral cultural repertoires. In most cases, however, it will be able to lift a significant part
of the so far hidden base of the culture iceberg above the surface.
Implications for human culture
Most elements which we nowadays naturally call the product of human culture can be found across the
globe and are thus human universals. In this time of increasing connectedness and global exchange
even the most complex human innovations often quickly reach the status of universals and would
not be recognized as socially learned innovations by their geographic distribution. Yet everyone
would agree that these innovations are an important part of our cultural repertoire.
What differentiates animal from human culture is the lack of normativity, the virtual absence of
cumulative culture and the enormous diversity of human cultural elements (Laland and Galef,
2009; Whiten, 2017; Whiten and van Schaik, 2007). These three features seem to remain a hallmark
of human culture and seem to be linked to the evolution of our species’ skill-intensive, technology-
dependent foraging niche (van Schaik et al., 2019; Laland, 2017). However, the unique human cultural
constellation was built on a surprisingly broad and evolutionarily deep foundation.
Conclusions
In sum, the true scope of animal culture will always be hard to estimate, but the most likely scenario is
that what we have discovered so far using the MoE is only the tip of the animal cultural iceberg. Given
that for most species social learning is the default mode of learning rather than the exception, reper-
toires of cultural behaviors are very likely to exceed current estimates. A wide spread of culture is in
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line with the notion that cultural capacity is an important tool that allows species to flexibly adapt to
changing environments. If we intend to engage in a fair comparison with humans, we have to list a
species’ complete repertoire of socially learned behaviors. Given that the right technique to capture
social learning can be developed (dependent on the modality of social learning of each species), we
will be able to compare the size and content of cultural repertoires across species. In the case of
the great apes, culture seems to pervade virtually all aspects of their life, making them fundamentally
as cultural as humans, just not cumulative, complex or normative.
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